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I. INTRODUCTION
History says, Don’t hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.
The Cure at Troy, Seamus Heaney1

In 1993, a report issued by the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights (now Human Rights First) began its initial chapter with the
following account:
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1. SEAMUS HEANEY, THE CURE AT TROY, A VERSION OF SOPHOCLES’ PHILOCTETES 77-78
(1990).
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During the evening of Sunday, February 12, 1989, Patrick
Finucane, a 38-year-old Belfast solicitor; his wife, Geraldine;
and his three children aged 9, 13, and 17 were eating dinner
and watching television in the kitchen of their home in North
Belfast. At approximately 7:25 p.m., a loud noise came from the
front door. Finucane and his wife jumped up from the table,
and Finucane opened the glass fire door leading to the front
hall. Halfway down the hall two masked figures dressed in
black with camouflage jackets advanced with drawn pistols.
Mrs. Finucane, who was standing just behind her husband,
attempted to activate a panic alarm behind the kitchen door.
According to Finucane’s eldest son, his father’s last act was to
throw himself up against the door. Two or three shots
shattered the glass and hit Finucane in the chest and stomach,
leaving him lying face up on the floor. The gunmen entered the
kitchen and shot Finucane in the head and neck about a dozen
more times, at least once and probably more from a range of
about 15 inches. At some point, Mrs. Finucane was herself
wounded in the ankle, probably by a ricocheting bullet. The
children were unharmed physically but witnessed
everything.2

The next day the Ulster Freedom Fighters (“UFF”), a loyalist
paramilitary group, claimed responsibility for the murder.3
The Lawyers Committee report went on to explain that the
security forces then operating in Northern Ireland had colluded in
the killing. It stated first that: “There is substantial evidence
suggesting the British Army’s complicity in Finucane’s murder.”4
In addition, it noted:
There is also substantial evidence pointing to the involvement
of the RUC [the Royal Ulster Constabulary, then Northern
Ireland’s police force] in the form of knowing acquiescence or
perhaps even instigation. Two independent sources told us
that the RUC had a double agent in the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA) [a related loyalist paramilitary group].
According to these sources, the double agent informed the RUC

2. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 24 (1993).
3. Id. at 25.
4. Id. at 3.
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that Finucane was a target, assuming they would prevent the
murder from taking place.5

Patrick Finucane’s murder was but one of six cases that
Canadian Justice Peter Cory was later called upon to investigate.6
These, in turn, involved but seven deaths out of over 3,000 killings
associated with “the Troubles,”7 the era of violent civil strife that
plagued Northern Ireland roughly from 1968, when peaceful civil
rights protests were met by rioting, through 1998, the year the
Irish and UK governments concluded the “Good Friday
Agreement,” and with it a substantial reduction in political
violence.8 Every one of these deaths is unique and tragic. Yet the
six cases that Justice Cory was called upon to examine were singled
out for several reasons. Each instance, in some measure, involved
a victim or victims that was high-profile or symbolic, entailed
evidence of collusion between paramilitaries and British or Irish
state authorities, or raised suspicions that the relevant
government actors had been actively seeking to suppress the truth,
and so remained a matter of “grave public concern.” 9 On these
bases the Irish and UK governments, in the follow-on Weston Park
Agreement of 2001, among other things agreed to “appoint a judge
of international standing from outside both jurisdictions to
undertake a thorough investigation of allegations of collusion in
the cases . . . ” 10 The judge of international standing was Peter
Cory.11
In the Essay that follows, fellow Canadian Justice Rene
Pomerance offers a fresh perspective on why Justice Cory’s effort
was a high point, yet one that remains incomplete, in Northern
Ireland’s ongoing quest for transitional justice. Her effort fittingly
pays tribute to Justice Cory’s unwavering commitment to his
5. Id.
6. Pomerance, infra.
7. Table NI-SEC-04: Deaths (number) due to the security situation in Northern Ireland
(only), 1969-2015, CAIN WEB SERV., https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#04
[https://perma.cc/4K5T-MYTJ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
8. For one of many books on the Troubles, see David McKittrick & David McVea,
MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES (2012).
9. Implementation Plan issued by the British and Irish Governments on 1 August 2001,
CAIN
WEB
SERV.,
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/bi010801.htm
[https://perma.cc/R9N8-GT3U] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (detailing the British and Irish
governments’ plan to implement the Good Friday Agreement).
10. Id.
11. Pomerance, infra.
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charge, qualities she witnessed firsthand as his then assistant.
Importantly, it also provides new and disturbing information
about British government attempts to impede his work, especially
with regard to the murder of Patrick Finucane. Justice Pomerance’s
contribution also sheds light on why Justice Cory’s
recommendations have yet to be fully implemented.
This essay will attempt to place Justice Pomerance’s account
in context. It will do so by concentrating only on the especially
sensitive Finucane case, yet from several broader perspectives.
First, it will highlight Justice Cory’s achievement by contrasting his
investigation with the failed inquiries that came both before and
after. Next, it will emphasize the features of Justice Cory’s inquiry
that made it a breakthrough, notwithstanding the alarming
resistance it met as provided by Justice Pomerance. Most
importantly, this piece will underscore how Justice Cory’s
challenge, though yet unmet, continues to provide the one basis for
the only just resolution of the Finucane murder.
II. THE FAILURE OF PRIOR INQUIRIES
Cory exemplifies an old practical challenge recognized in a
still-pioneering academic field—transitional justice. Ruti Teitel,
who wrote the (leading) book on the topic, states that:
“[t]ransitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal
responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor
regimes.” 12 Mechanisms to realize transitional justice in a given
jurisdiction reflect a broad range of options. In certain cases,
starting with the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, at
least some accused of humanitarian and human rights violations
have been subject to criminal trial, including the death penalty. In
other situations, various considerations lead to the opposite
approach of granting a general amnesty. Any number of
approaches have fallen in between, perhaps most famously the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, through

12. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).
For a comprehensive analysis of transitional justice, see RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (2000).
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which amnesty was granted, but only to the extent that individuals
fully disclose their wrongdoing.13
By contrast, the approach to transitional justice in Northern
Ireland has been delayed, contested, and anything but coherent. To
an extent, the confused situation reflects the fact that the
predecessor regime, which oversaw previous wrongdoing,
remains in power. As it was, peace presented possibilities but in
and of itself did not point in any obvious direction. In particular,
the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which effectively brought an end
to the Troubles, simply did not address the thorny issue of how
best to deal with the legacy of over 3,000 unsolved political
killings.14 As far as a general initiative, little occurred until 2005.
That year the reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland, the
successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary, launched its Historical
Enquires Team (“HET”), to investigate these deaths, and make
findings that, given sufficient evidence, could be prosecuted by the
Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”). 15 Supplementing this
initiative are investigations by the Police Ombudsman of Northern
Ireland (“PONI”), which focuses on allegations of misconduct by
the police.16
These efforts have yielded much new information, yet have
not come without controversy concerning their slow pace, the
impartiality of the HET in particular, and ongoing disagreement as
to what should be done on the basis of the evidence uncovered. The
2014 Stormont House Agreement, which reestablished Northern
Ireland’s shared executive, sought to deal with these and other
issues. Among other things, the Agreement calls for the
establishment of a new independent Historical Investigations Unit
(“HIU”). Yet as with the Police Service’s HET, the new unit would
leave the decision to prosecute or not with the DPP.17 Of greater
concern, earlier this year the Conservative UK Government
13. See Transitional Justice Genealogy, supra note 12, at 77 n.57; see also Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 35 of 1995 § 20 (S. Afr.) (on the need for amnesty
applicants to make a “full disclosure” of their acts).
14. See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, 2114 U.N.T.S.
473.
15. DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATIONS INTO FATALITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
INVOLVING BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL, 2016-17, HC 1064, ¶¶ 8, 20, 22 (UK).
16. Id.
17. Stormont House Agreement art. 30-40, Ir.-U.K., Dec. 23, 2014.
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introduced legislation that would make the prospect of
prosecution even more remote. According to its announcement,
“[t]he Government will ensure that the investigations which are
necessary are effective and thorough, but quick . . . . Only cases in
which there is a realistic prospect of a prosecution as a result of
new compelling evidence would proceed to a full police
investigation and if necessary, prosecution.” 18 Otherwise, a case
“would be closed . . . though family reports would still be provided
to the victims’ loved ones.”19 In effect, Northern Ireland’s approach
to transitional justice will likely prove to be a mix of long delayed
investigations augmented by rare and occasional prosecutions.
Standing apart from this patchwork were the inquiries
undertaken by Justice Cory. As noted, the Irish and UK
governments in the 2001 Weston Park Agreement agreed to do
something about transitional justice legacy issues pending a more
comprehensive solution. That something was to single out a
handful of high-profile cases drawn from each community to be
subject to a serious, independent investigation. 20 The ultimate
selection comprised the cases of Patrick Finucane, Lord Justice and
Lady Gibson, Robert Hamill, Rosemary Nelson, and Billy Wright.
Justice Pomerance concisely sets out both the circumstances of
each killing and why they resonated. 21 As only an insider can,
Justice Pomerance also recounts the successes and challenges that
this entailed.22
Yet as she also makes clear, of all six inquiries Justice Cory
took up, the most ill-starred was and remains the murder of Patrick
Finucane. 23 Almost from the first, the press and international
human rights groups reported credible evidence of collusion by the
security forces—both the RUC and British Army—in facilitating
the killing. 24 Over time they kept up the pressure and aired new
18. Press Release, U.K. Gov’t Northern Ireland Office, Addressing Northern Ireland
Legacy Issues (Mar. 18, 2020).
19. Id.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
21. See Pomerance, infra.
22. See Pomerance, infra.
23. See Pomerance, infra. For an excellent account of the Finucane murder and the
failure of subsequent inquiries, see Joaquin P. Terceno III, Burying the Truth: The Murder
of Belfast Lawyer Patrick Finucane and Britain’s “Secret” Public Inquires, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
3297 (2006).
24. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 52-58.
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information. Especially dogged in this regard were the then
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, British Irish Rights Watch,
and the BBC’s Panorama program. By contrast, the first relevant
official investigations touched upon the Finucane case incidentally.
Both were conducted by John (now Sir) Stevens, the Chief
Constable of the Northumbria police who would go on to head the
Metropolitan (London) police. The first inquiry, ordered in 1989,
examined possible official collusion in the sectarian killing of
Loughlin Maginn, a Catholic with no paramilitary connections. 25
“Stevens I” would uncover a double agent in a loyalist paramilitary
group who passed information to and from the British Army.
“Stevens II,” begun in 1994, turned more generally to collusion
between loyalist groups and the security forces. At the time, much
speculation arose as to the extent any findings of collusion by
Stevens overlapped with evidence that had already come to light
concerning Finucane. The reports helped conclude that although
collusion existed, nothing beyond an executive summary was
released.26
Only with “Stevens III,” which began in 1999, did an official
inquiry specifically investigate collusion in the Finucane case. 27
Eventually a Commissioner of the Metropolitan (London) Police,
Stevens’ 2003 report confirmed the suspicions raised by the press
and human rights groups a decade before.28 Substantial evidence
existed that the RUC as well as the British Army could have
prevented the killing, had in other ways facilitated it, did not
conduct adequate investigations into the murder, and to the
contrary had taken various measures to make sure that the truth
would never come to light.29
At the end of the day, the Stevens inquiries still involved police
investigating police (and Army), did not involve public hearings,
and did not result in any convictions. One individual, William
25. The Stevens Inquiry: Chronology, BBC (Apr. 17, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2954383.stm
[https://perma.cc/HZS9-S5R2].
26. Id.
27. Sir John Stevens, Stevens Inquiry 3: Overview and Recommendations, RELATIVES
FOR
JUSTICE
(Apr.
17,
2003),
https://relativesforjustice.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Stevens-3-Inquiry-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DW6KMPME].
28. See supra text accompanying note 26.
29. Stevens, supra note 27.
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Stobie, who allegedly had supplied the guns for the murder, did
stand trial for his involvement, but the trial collapsed for the lack
of evidence, and Stobie was later shot dead, with a loyalist
paramilitary group claiming responsibility. 30 Likewise troubling,
Stevens reported resistance to his investigations at almost every
turn, including a suspicious fire at his team’s office during Stevens
I.31 This resistance in its own way tended to support the picture
that had been steadily emerging. In their effort to obtain
intelligence, the security forces had compromised themselves and
the rule of law by tolerating, and even facilitating, the crimes of
informers and agents in paramilitary groups to obtain
information.32
III. CORY’S BREAKTHROUGH
Against this backdrop, Justice Cory’s inquiry represented a
giant leap forward. First, it provided the most comprehensive
account of the evidence that had been uncovered regarding Patrick
Finucane’s murder. Second, it argued in no uncertain terms for the
need of an independent public inquiry.
Even without the official resistance she recounts, Justice
Pomerance gives some idea of the challenge in bringing together
the many complex leads and threads that the case involves. It must
be said that the eventual report, released in 2004, met that
challenge masterfully. 33 As it was an independent investigation
conducted by a foreign judge, Justice Cory was under no constraint
to limit the publication of his team’s findings to a brief executive
summary. 34 Instead the result ran over 100 pages of densely
packed detail. 35 That rigor, however, did not prevent the report
from making a clear and compelling case. Overwhelming evidence
indicated that two units of the security forces had played a role in
the murder. One was the Force Research Unit of the British Army.
The other was the Special Branch of the RUC. Each group had been
heavily involved in the use of informers and agents in the loyalist
paramilitaries in particular. To keep these agents in place, their
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, PATRICK FINUCANE, 2004, HC 470, (UK).
Pomerance, infra.
Pomerance, infra.
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government handlers and higher-ups were more than ready to
look the other way, or even help out, when it came to their
paramilitary groups engaged in various operations, including
murder. The report also made clear that Finucane’s murder was
likely just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.36
In part for that reason, Justice Cory fulfilled his mandate with
an unambiguous call for an immediate public inquiry. At the time,
there was concern that a delayed and desultory prosecution might
delay such an inquiry, and the Cory report left no doubt as to which
should take precedence. In its own words:
The Finucane case was specifically chosen as one of the six
cases to be reviewed to determine if there was sufficient
evidence of collusion to warrant the directing of a public
inquiry. In light of this provision in the original agreement, the
failure to hold a public inquiry as quickly as it is reasonably
possible to do so could be seen as a denial of that agreement,
which appears to have been an important and integral part of
the peace process.37

No less important, the Report left no doubt as to what a
genuine public inquiry should entail. Among other things, it would
require:
An independent commissioner or panel of commissioners.
[The tribunal having] full power to subpoena witnesses and
documents together with all the powers usually exercised by a
commissioner in a public inquiry.
[The tribunal selecting] its own counsel who should have all
the powers usually associated with counsel appointed to act
for a commission or tribunal of public inquiry.
[The tribunal] empowered to engage investigators who might
be police officers or retired police officers to carry out such
investigative or other tasks as may be deemed essential to the
work of the tribunal.
The hearings, to the extent possible, should be held in public.
The findings and recommendations of the Commissioners
should be in writing and made public.38

36. CORY COLLUSION INQUIRY REPORT, PATRICK FINUCANE, supra note 33, at ¶ 1.41-12.70.
37. Id. at ¶ 1.296.
38. Id. at ¶ 1.294.
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With Justice Cory’s efforts, not only was the Weston Park
Agreement apparently fulfilled, it looked as though the truth
behind the Finucane murder, and the Pandora’s box of systemic
government collusion, was at last at hand.
IV. UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Things didn’t quite work out that way. Prophetically, Cory’s
report on Finucane noted, “[t]he failure [to undertake an
independent public inquiry] could be seen as a cynical breach of
faith which could have unfortunate consequences for the peace
accord.” 39 Not incidentally, it went on to note the effects of any
significant delay: “The Finucane family will be devastated. A large
part of the Northern Ireland community will be frustrated. Myths
and misconceptions will proliferate and hopes of peace and
understanding will be eroded.”40
Against Justice Cory’s counsel, not only was there delay, but to
date a public inquiry has yet to take place. Instead the UK
government’s response has effectively justified a charge of “cynical
breach of faith.”41 To begin, the government forged ahead with just
the type of prosecution that would delay an inquiry. That initiative
at least led to the guilty plea of Ken Barrett, the triggerman, the one
man convicted in the Finucane murder.42 Apart from any delay, the
conviction was met with suspicions that genuine accountability
would proceed no higher than this single loyalist agent and
paramilitary.43
Worse, however, is what came next. In 2005 Parliament
enacted a new Public Inquiries Act that severely restricted the
independence and power of such investigations as they had
previously been undertaken.44 Then, dramatically in 2007, Prime
39. Id. at ¶ 1.296.
40. Id. at ¶ 1.299.
41. Id. at ¶ 1.296.
42. Barrett gets 22-year term for the Pat Finucane murder, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 16,
2004), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/barrett-gets-22-year-term-for-pat-finucanemurder-1.990214 [https://perma.cc/D9FZ-5SUN].
43. Press release from the Finucane family following the conviction of Ken Barrett, PAT
FINUCANE CTR. (Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.patfinucanecentre.org/pat-finucane/pressrelease-finucane-family-follwing-conviction-ken-barrett [https://perma.cc/5U5E-X7DQ].
44. U.K. Public Inquiries Act 2005, c. 12 (Eng.)
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/12/contents [https://perma.cc/KP56Y6YS] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
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Minister David Cameron met with the Finucane family and its
representatives at 10 Downing Street. There he admitted to and
apologized for collusion by the security forces in the killing. At the
same meeting, he announced that an official inquiry into the
murder would indeed be conducted, only by a lawyer, Sir Desmond
de Silva QC, who would not have subpoena power, hold hearings,
or engage a team of investigators as Justice Cory had urged.45
The Finucane family, as well as human rights groups, rightly
condemned the procedure as a “sham.” 46 Just last year, the UK
Supreme Court effectively agreed. In a suit brought by the Finucane
family, the Court determined that the de Silva review did not
comply with Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights,
which guarantees the right to life. 47 Put another way, the
government could have avoided this judicial rebuke had it followed
Justice Cory’s recommendations.
No less troubling than the official half measures, foot dragging,
and palliatives is the government toleration of the obstruction of
any and all inquiries. As noted, the Stevens inquires met with often
blatant obstruction by the security forces under investigation,
efforts that Stevens himself consistently decried.48 It should come
as no surprise that the Cory Investigation met with similar
resistance. Some incidents have come to light but remain

45. John F. Burns, British Prime Minister Apologizes in Killing of I.R.A. Lawyer, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/europe/cameronapologizes-for-british-role-in-finucane-killing.html [https://perma.cc/2TYA-TZB5]. It
should not go without comment that the Times’s slapdash headline is misleading to the
point of being libelous. As noted, there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Finucane was a
member of or associated with the IRA. Likewise, certain of Mr. Finucane’s clients were
alleged to have been members of the IRA, but that fact hardly justifies of epithet of “I.R.A.
Lawyer.” On the lack of Da Silva’s subpoena power, see Ed Neafsy, Case of murdered
Troubles lawyer Patrick Finucane returns to court, IRISH CENT. (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.irishcentral.com/opinion/finucane-inquiry-courtcase
[https://perma.cc/C4ZA-7UVU].
46. Owen Bowcott, Pat Finucane’s family denounce report as “sham”, GUARDIAN (Dec.
12, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-family-reportsham [https://perma.cc/FNS2-FSVD].
47. In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review (Northern
Ireland) [2019] UKSC 7, [24] (appeal taken from NICA).
48. Stevens, supra note 27, at paras. 3.1-3.5.
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underreported, foremost the security services wiping out the Cory
team’s hard drives.49
In this light, one signal service that Justice Pomerance’s piece
performs is to show the scope of the government’s efforts to
undermine the Cory team’s efforts—and Justice Cory’s often
brilliant parries to keep the investigation going and to exert
pressure for its release. In these ways, the account that follows
importantly adds to the historical record. It also provides an
inspiring model for how transitional justice should be sought, both
in Northern Ireland and beyond.
On that note, the UK government has yet to fulfill Justice
Cory’s recommendation or the decision of its own highest court.

49. MI5 erased hard drives held by collusion inquiry, BBC investigation reveals, IRISH
LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.irishlegal.com/article/mi5-erased-hard-drivesheld-by-collusion-inquiry-bbc-investigation-reveals [https://perma.cc/YU9A-LSNR].

